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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH , : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : 
: Case No. 20030677-CA 
JAMES ANDREW NARANJO, 
Defendant/Appellant : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a jury's finding of guilt of one count of possession of a 
controlled substance with the intent to distribute, a first degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Annotated §58-37-8(1 )(a)(iii) on June 30, 2003, and the trial court's denial 
of Defendant's motion to suppress evidence on June 16, 2003. The Defendant was 
sentenced to a term of five years to life at the Utah State Prison on August 5, 2003. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the pour over provision in U.C.A. § 78-2a-
30X2003). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. DID OFFICER VALENTINE VIOLATE THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT WHEN HE DETAINED AND SEARCHED THE 
DEFENDANT? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court's finding of facts should be 
reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard of review. The trial court's conclusions 
of law should be reviewed for correctness. This is a search and seizure case, therefore 
this Court should grant the trial court's legal determinations a measure of discretion in 
applying the standard to the given facts. See, State v. Valdez, 68 P.3d 1052, 1054 (Ct. 
App. 2003). This issue was preserved in the trial court when the Defendant's attorney 
filed a written motion to suppress the evidence, (R. 014-017), and when he renewed 
the motion to suppress during the trial. (R. 113/59). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Fourth Amendment 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Section 58-37-8(1 )(a)(iii) Prohibited acts -- Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A - Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly 
and intentionally: 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or 
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Section 78-2a-3(j)(2003) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including 
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: cases transferred to the Court of Appeals 
from the Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged by information with possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute, a first-degree felony, and possession of drug 
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. (R. 001). A preliminary hearing was held on 
April 15, 2003. The Defendant was bound over to stand trial. (R. 008-09). On May 
12, 2003, Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence. (R. 014-018). The State 
responded with a written objection to the motion to suppress. (R. 021-032). Oral 
arguments on the motion were held on June 16, 2003. The trial court denied 
Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence. (R. 038). The trial judge asked the 
State to prepare the findings of fact, conclusions of law and an order. (R. 112/26). A 
review of the record suggests that this was not done. The official court record does 
not include findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a signed order denying the 
motion to suppress. A jury trial was held on June 30, 2003. The Defendant was 
found guilty of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to distribute, a 
first-degree felony. During the trial, Defendant's attorney renewed his motion to 
suppress. (R. 113/59). The state dismissed count two of the original information, 
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. (R. 050-51). The 
Defendant was sentenced on August 5, 2003 to a term of five years to life at the Utah 
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State Prison. (R. 100). The sentence, judgment and commitment was signed on 
August 6, 2003. A notice of appeal was filed August 11, 2003. 
STATEiWENT OF THE FACTS 
On January 5, 2003, Officer David Valentine ("Valentine") of the Weber State 
University Police Department received a dispatch that a professor had seen a Hispanic 
male wearing a red jacket was looking in vehicles in the Al parking lot on the Weber 
State campus. (R. 113/18). Officer Valentine exited the Social Science Building and 
was walking to his car when he noticed the Defendant wearing a red coat riding his 
bicycle. (R. 115/7). Officer Valentine got into his marked police car and pulled up 
behind the Defendant as he was still riding his bike. (R. 115/7). Officer Valentine 
used either his car horn or air horn to get Defendant's attention as he pulled up behind 
him. (R. 115/7-8). 
The Defendant stopped riding his bike. He put his feet down on the ground and 
turned back to look at the officer. (R. 115/8). Officer Valentine got out of his vehicle 
and indicated that he wanted to talk to the Defendant. (R. 115/8-9). The Defendant 
said he was going "up over here" as he pointed to the southwest. He then pedaled 
away. (R. 115/9). Officer Valentine got back into his patrol car and followed after 
him. The Defendant was riding his bike up a hill in the wrong lane of traffic. (R. 
115/12). Officer Valentine noticed a "black object" in one of the Defendants back 
pockets. Officer Valentine did not know what it was, but it appeared to be metallic. 
(R. 115/9). 
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Officer Valentine activated his emergency lights. He looked down as he did 
this. (R. 115/10). When Officer Valentine looked back up the Defendant's bicycle 
was laying in the street and he was walking towards the patrol vehicle. (R. 115/11). 
The Defendant was making eye contact with Officer Valentine as he approached his 
vehicle. He was talking on a cell phone and was making what the officer described as 
a "steady aggressive walk toward the passenger side on my car." (R. 115/12). During 
the trial, Valentine was asked what the Defendant did that was angry or aggressive. 
(R. 113/27-28) His answer was, "the eye contact for one, the constant staring eye 
contact as he was walking in a deliberate manner approaching my vehicle." (R. 
113/28). As Defendant was approaching the patrol vehicle, Officer Valentine 
observed him put his hand in one of his front pockets and retrieve an item that 
Valentine believed he was hiding from him. (R. 115/13). 
Officer Valentine got out of his car and began conversing with the Defendant. 
Valentine told the Defendant to show him what was in his hand. (R. 115/13). Officer 
Valentine was concerned that the Defendant was hiding a weapon. He also testified 
that Defendant was aggressively approaching his vehicle. When asked what he was 
doing that made the approach aggressive, the officer testified that he had an "angry, 
angry stare." (R. 115/14). During cross-examination at the trial, Officer Valentine 
testified that Defendant was talking on a cell phone as he approached him. He 
initially had the cell phone in his left hand but he didn't see what he did with it. 
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Valentine admitted that the object that was in his right hand could have been the cell 
phone. (R. 113/58). 
Officer Valentine testified that the Defendant was yelling at him, but he 
couldn't understand what he was saying. (R. 115/14). At the trial, Valentine testified 
that Defendant was talking on a cell phone. He stated that "I had heard him tell the 
person on the phone that the cop wants to talk to me so, yes, he was yelling at me and 
talking on his cell phone." (R. 113/57). Officer Valentine told the Defendant to step 
around to the front of the vehicle. (R. 115/15). The Defendant walked around to the 
front of the vehicle as directed. However, he didn't stop there. He continued to walk 
towards Officer Valentine who was behind the driver's side door. (R. 115/15). 
Officer Valentine drew his gun and told Defendant to stop. Defendant 
continued to walk so Officer Valentine pointed his gun at Defendant. At this point, 
Defendant stopped walking towards the officer. (R. 115/16). Officer Valentine told 
Defendant to show him his hands. The Defendant began emptying his pockets and 
"tossing objects into the grass." Id. Officer Valentine later discovered that the 
Defendant had thrown a screwdriver that looked like a miniature crowbar, a "rasp" 
file, and a flashlight. (R. 115/116-17). The Defendant also threw or dropped a cell 
phone, a protective case for a car stereo, a bandana, a CD and "assorted items." (R. 
115/18). Defendant was yelling "you want to see what's in my hand, do you want to 
see what I've got" as he emptied his pockets. Id. 
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Officer Valentine ordered the Defendant to his knees. He continued to empty 
his pockets and then knelt down. (R. 115/19). Officer Valentine ordered him to lay 
down on the pavement. Id. Officer Valentine handcuffed him and then frisked him. 
Id. Valentine stood him up and then began patting him down for weapons. Valentine 
lifted the Defendant's pant leg up and a plastic bindle fell out of his right pant leg. (R. 
115/21). While Valentine was conducting the pat down, the Defendant kept pressing 
his hip against the patrol car. Valentine believed that the Defendant had something 
that he didn't want him to find. (R. 115/22). Valentine then "began taking him to the 
ground . . . " Id. 
At this point, another officer arrived and took control of the Defendant. (R. 
115/23). Valentine picked up the bindle and the Defendant stated, "that's heroin." 
(R. 115/24). He also indicated that he was delivering it to a friend. Id. 
On cross-examination, the officer admitted that he had his gun out and he told 
the Defendant to show him what was in his hand and that's when the Defendant 
started throwing things onto the ground. (R. 115/33). Officer Valentine was asked 
why he decided to frisk Defendant and he answered, "I don't know what's in his 
possession, I need to look out for myself. . ." Id. Officer Valentine hadn't noticed 
any bulges in Defendant's pockets. Id. Defense counsel asked Officer Valentine why 
he decided to frisk the Defendant. Valentine answered. "It's procedure. Thaf s 
something I do when I'm going to handcuff somebody. That's what I'm taught." (R. 
115/34). 
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Valentine acknowledged that Defendant wasn't under arrest, but he has being 
handcuffed "for our safety; my safety and his safety." Id. Valentine then 
acknowledged that his information was only that the Defendant was looking in 
windows and he had no reason to believe that Defendant had done anything illegal. 
(R. 115/34-35). Officer Valentine was asked a second time why he handcuffed 
Defendant. (R. 115/35). His response was "his aggressive nature and behavior." Id. 
After an objection, defense counsel asked "was he yelling at you because you stopped 
him?" Id. 
Valentine answered, "I don't know why he was yelling at me." Defense 
counsel asked "what was he saying to you?" Valentine answered, "I couldn't 
understand at first." Defense counsel asked, what did he say when you heard him?" 
valentine answered, "He was saying, you want to see what's in my pockets, I'll show 
you what I've got." 
Defense counsel replied, "But you stopped him, you pulled your gun on him, 
you ordered him to the ground, you handcuffed, him correct? He wasn't under arrest, 
you had no information he had committed any crimes at that time, correct?" (R. 
115/35-36) Officer Valentine answered, "correct." (R. 115/36). Officer Valentine 
also acknowledged that when he frisked the Defendant, he pulled up his right pant leg 
and that's when the bindle of heroin fell out. Id. Defense counsel said, "now, that 
wasn't a pat-down. You were actually pulling up the pant leg to see what was there, 
correct?" 
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Officer Valentine answered, "I couldn't bend over far enough to safely do it so 
I lifted the pant leg, yes." Id. Valentine hadn't seen any criminal activity up to this 
point and he didn't have consent to pull up Defendant's pant leg and it was when he 
pulled up the pant leg that the bindle fell out. (R. 115/37). Officer Valentine later 
explained that the reason he pulled the pants up rather than do a pat down was because 
he's "a rather large officer with a big belly and I'm still trying to control his hands 
with one hand and yet still safely reach down to his ankle and I couldn't feel his ankle 
--" (R. 115/39). During the trial Officer Valentine admitted that he pulled up 
Defendant's pant leg so he could see his sock and that he couldn't see it without 
pulling up the pant leg. (R. 113/58). 
The substance that was found in the bindle was sent to the State crime lab. It 
was tested by a chemist and tested positive as heroin. (R. 113/90). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Defendant's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable 
searches was violated repeatedly during his encounter with Officer Valentine. The 
first violation occurred when Officer Valentine detained the Defendant without 
sufficient facts that would suggest the Defendant was engaged in criminal activity. 
The Defendant was upset by this detention and angrily emptied his pockets. Officer 
Valentine pointed his gun at the Defendant and then ordered him to the ground. 
Defendant's rights were further violated when Officer Valentine handcuffed him and 
proceeded to frisk him. For arguments sake even if this Court found that Officer 
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Valentine's actions were reasonable under the circumstances, his frisk of the 
Defendant exceeded the scope of what is allowed by the Supreme Court in Terry v. 
Ohio 392 U.S. 1 (1968)- Officer Valentine lifted the Defendant's pant leg and while 
he did this a bindle of heroin fell out. Since Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights 
were violated the evidence that was discovered should have been suppressed by the 
trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
OFFICER VALENTINE VIOLATED DEFENDANT'S FOURTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHTS WHEN HE DETAINED AND 
SEARCHED HIM. 
There are generally three levels of constitutionally permissible encounters 
between law enforcement officers and the general public. 
(l)an officer may approach a citizen at anytime and pose questions so 
long as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may 
seize a person if the officer has an 'articulable suspicion7 that the person 
has committed or is about to commit a crime; however, the 'detention 
must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the 
purpose of the stop'; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has 
probable cause to believe an offense has been committed or is being 
committed;' State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 
1987)(citations omitted). 
The Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated throughout his 
encounter with Officer Valentine. It began with the level two detention that wasn't 
supported by reasonable suspicion and continued when Defendant was ordered at 
gunpoint to submit to a search of his person. Each of these issues will be more fully 
articulated below. 
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A. The initial detention was not supported by reasonable suspicion. 
The encounter between Defendant and Officer Valentine was a level two 
stop that was not supported by reasonable suspicion. A level one encounter "is a 
voluntary encounter where a citizen may respond to an officer's inquiries but is free to 
leave at any time." State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In 
contrast, a level two stop occurs "when a reasonable person, in view of all the 
circumstances, would believe he or she is not free to leave." Id. It is a level two stop 
"even if the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention brief." State v. 
Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
A "totality of the circumstances" test should be employed to determine if a stop 
is a level two stop that requires reasonable suspicion. Under the totality of the 
circumstances, this was clearly a level two stop. Officer Valentine pulled his marked 
patrol vehicle behind the Defendant and honked his horn. When the Defendant 
stopped riding his bike, the officer got out of his vehicle and told the Defendant that 
he needed to talk to him. (R. 115/7-9). The Defendant communicated to the officer 
by his actions that he didn't want to speak with him. This was clear when he began 
pedaling his bicycle away from the officer. (R. 115/9). Officer Valentine followed 
after him and actually turned on his red and blue lights. (R. 115/10). When Officer 
Valentine looked back up, the Defendant had set his bike down and was walking back 
to him. (R. 115/11). By activating the red and blue lights on top of the police vehicle, 
Officer Valentine communicated to the Defendant that he must stop and that he was 
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not free to leave. This was clearly a show of authority and it would have been a 
criminal offense for the Defendant to have ignored the lights and to continue to pedal 
away. There is no citizen who would feel free to leave when a police officer has told 
you he needs to talk to you and then turns on the red and blue lights on top of the 
patrol vehicle. 
Even though the State argued that this was a level one encounter, (R. 112/6), 
the trial judge found that it was a level two stop. "At that point, when he turns on the 
lights, his overhead lights, it does seem to me that's a Level II stop at that point by 
turning those lights on." (R. 112/24). 
Since Officer Valentine initiated a Level II stop, he needed "specific, 
articulable facts which, together with rational inferences drawn from those facts, 
would lead a reasonable person to conclude [Defendant] had committed or was about 
to commit a crime." State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
The official record is void of any written findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. However, the trial court made oral findings at the conclusion of the hearing on 
the motion to suppress. The Court found that the following facts gave Officer 
Valentine reasonable suspicion that justified the initial detention. "First of all, we've 
got a known informant who contacted - who is a criminal justice professor who 
contacts dispatch, describes a suspicious person looking in vehicles and gives a 
description of some clothing apparently. Then the dispatch relays that information on 
to the officer. The officer at the campus then as he's walking to his car, as I recall it, 
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he sees a person who matches the description that he's been given from the dispatch. 
He gets into his police car, a marked car, pulls up behind the defendant who's riding 
his bike at that point. 
He does do this - - what I think is really agreed upon - - Level I stop at a point 
by either honking his air or car horn, stops the defendant who briefly says something 
to the effect of I'm going over there and points and then gets back on his bike and 
pedals away. He does pedal away in the opposing lane of traffic which would be a bit 
unusual. And the officer also notices a black object extending - - a metallic object 
extending from the back pocket of Mr. Naranjo.. 
. . .Then the officer turns on his lights. It's unclear at that point if he knew 
more than what I've just recited or not, but to me that alone is sufficient - - reasonable 
suspicion could be based on those articulable facts alone in my mind." (R. 112/23-
24). 
The trial court apparently found that the following facts gave Officer Valentine 
reasonable suspicion. 1) A criminal justice professor describes a person looking in 
vehicles and gives a description of the clothing that person was wearing. 2) The 
officer sees a person who matches the description. 3) After the officer initiates a level 
one stop, the suspect says he's going "over there" and then pedals away in the 
opposing lane of traffic which is "a bit unusual." 4) As the Defendant is pedaling 
away, the officer notices a black metallic object extending from the back pocket of the 
Defendant. 
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Under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Valentine lacked reasonable 
suspicion to stop and detain the Defendant. Under this analysis, there must be "a 
suspicion that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing." 
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981). The only information known to 
the officer was that a person had looked in car windows, the Defendant matched that 
persons description, the Defendant didn't want to talk to the officer and he had a black 
metallic object in his back pocket. There is nothing in these facts to support a level 
two detention. 
The officer admitted that he didn't even have information that the Defendant 
had done anything illegal (R. 115/34-35). It is not against the law to look into a 
vehicle. There are a number of innocent reasons that might cause someone to look 
inside a vehicle. Furthermore, a person might look at an object through a window and 
consider stealing it, but then reconsider and walk away. There is no crime in the 
thought, provided the person doesn't enter or attempt to enter the vehicle. In this case, 
Officer Valentine did not have any information that the person looking inside the 
vehicles ever attempted to enter one of them. 
The evidence from the preliminary hearing was used as a factual basis for the 
motion to suppress. The dispatch tape was played at the preliminary hearing but was 
not transcribed into the record. (R. 115/5-6). During the hearing on the motion to 
suppress, Defendant's attorney did give insight into the information that was on the 
tape. u[H]e said he saw a suspicious person looking in the vehicles, that in and of 
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itself I would submit is not enough without saying how many vehicles? How he was 
looking into them? What made him suspicious? Did he look in one vehicle? Did he 
look in a dozen? How was he looking into them? Was it a casual glance or was he 
staring into them with his eyes up against them? You know, like I said, it could have 
been one vehicle. There may have been something interesting on the seat, an article 
in the newspaper, a headline or something that caught his eye. We don't know that 
based upon what's in the dispatch tapes and in the testimony . . ." (R. 112/20-21). 
During the trial, the officer indicated that dispatch told him that an individual 
had "called in and reported seeing a Hispanic male wearing a red type of jacket or 
coat that was looking in vehicles in the Al parking lot." (R. 113/18). Again, there is 
no information that criminal activity was actually afoot, and when the officer 
observed the Defendant he was not looking in vehicles, but instead was riding his bike 
through campus. 
In State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), an officer observed three 
individuals walking slowly and peering into business windows at 3:30 a.m. There had 
been several "car prowls" in the area in prior weeks. The trio looked in windows, but 
steadily progressed down the street. The officer stopped his car at the curb and 
watched the trio. He noticed a nylon knapsack the defendant carried at his side. He 
observed the defendant shift the knapsack from his side to his front in what the officer 
considered an effort to conceal it. The officer did not see the trio violate any 
ordinances or engage in any criminal behavior. The officer eventually approached the 
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trio. The defendant placed the knapsack next to a garbage can in an effort that the 
officer regarded as an effort to "stash it." All three individuals walked towards the 
officer and he asked them for identification and what they were doing. They appeared 
nervous as they did this. Id. at 86. 
A back-up officer arrived. When the back-up arrived the original officer took 
hold of the defendant, told him to place his hands on the patrol car and spread his feet. 
The officer then patted down the outer surfaces of his clothing. The officer found a 
knife strapped to the defendant's chest and he was eventually charged with possession 
of a weapon by a restricted person. Id. 
This Court found that the seizure of the defendant was unconstitutional and the 
facts did not support a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was engaged in 
criminal conduct. Id. at 89. The Court stated that the defendant "progressed steadily 
south on State Street. They did not retrace their steps, stare repeatedly in the same 
store window 'casing' the business, or hover repeatedly on the same street corner." 
Id. 
In the case at bar, the Defendant was riding his bike across campus on a Sunday 
at 1:20 p.m. when he was stopped. The information the officer had was insufficient to 
believe that the Defendant was engaged in criminal activity. Valentine had been told 
that a suspicious person was looking in car windows. Defendant's trial attorney 
correctly noted that "he said he saw a suspicious person looking in the vehicles, that 
in and of itself I would submit is not enough without saying how many vehicles? How 
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he was looking into them? What made him suspicious? Did he look in one vehicle? 
Did he look in a dozen? How was he looking into them? Was it a casual glance or 
was he staring into them with his eyes up against them? You know, like I said, it 
could have been one vehicle. There may have been something interesting on the seat, 
an article in the newspaper, a headline or something that caught his eye. We don't 
know that based upon what's in the dispatch tapes and in the testimony . . ." (R. 
112/20-21). The officer simply did not have enough information, nor did he 
personally observe the Defendant do anything that would justify a detention. 
An officer may rely on a dispatched report to make a stop. However, the 
agency that makes the dispatch must have sufficient reasonable suspicion, through 
specific and articulable facts, to justify a detention. See, United States v. Hensley, 469 
U.S. 221, 232 (1985). If there are insufficient facts, as there are in this case, then the 
officer must provide independent or corroborating information through his personal 
observations. See, State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1277 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Valentine did not observe any conduct that would lead a reasonable person to believe 
that the Defendant was involved in criminal activity. The fact that he noticed a 
Hispanic male in a red jacket is not corroboration. See, State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 
1279 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)("This is not corroboration of criminal activity, only of 
physical characteristics that by themselves have no relevance to criminal activity."). 
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Since Officer Valentine did not have reasonable suspicion that justified 
stopping and detaining the Defendant the evidence that was discovered should have 
been suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. 
B. Officer Valentine didn't have reasonable suspicion to conduct a 
Terry frisk. 
Even if this Court finds that Officer Valentine had reasonable suspicion to stop 
and detain the Defendant, Officer Valentine was not justified in ordering Defendant to 
the ground and conducting a Terry frisk. In Terry v. Ohio, the United States Supreme 
Court held that officers can frisk a suspect following an investigatory stop to allow 
police officers to protect themselves. See, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
Even though a defendant may be stopped as part of an investigatory stop, he is 
still protected from unreasonable searches by the Fourth Amendment. "[The Supreme 
Court] declared that the Fourth Amendment unquestionably protected suspects 
subjected to investigatory confrontations." State v. White, 856 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993). Each frisk must be "justified at its inception, and . . . reasonably 
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first 
place." Terry v. Ohio, at 20. The reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct a Teny 
frisk must be separate and independent from the reasonable suspicion that justified the 
initial detention. "Where a police officer validly stops an individual for investigatory 
or other purposes and reasonably believes that the individual may be armed and 
dangerous, the officer may conduct a 'frisk' or pat-down' search of the individual to 
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discover weapons that might be used against him." State v. Warren, 37 P.3d 270, 273 
(Utah Ct. App. 2001)(emphasis in original)(quoting State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 659 
(Utah 1985). The State has the burden to show that the circumstances created the 
need for the frisk. See, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971). 
Terry v. Ohio authorized "a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable 
search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to 
believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of 
whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime." Terry v. Ohio, at 
27. In determining whether the officer acted reasonably, "due weight must be given, 
not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,' but to the specific 
reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his 
experience." Id. 
Officer Valentine was not able to point to specific articulable facts that 
indicated the Defendant was armed or dangerous. After Officer Valentine turned on 
his blue and red lights and the Defendant put his bike down, the Defendant began 
walking towards Officer Valentine's passenger door. At various times during the 
preliminary hearing and trial, Officer Valentine testified about the factors that caused 
him to conduct a Terry frisk. Officer Valentine apparently relied on the following 
factors. First, as Defendant approached his passenger door he had "a steady 
aggressive walk toward the passenger side of my car and he's making eye contact 
with me at the time that he's approaching me. (R. 115/12). At the trial Valentine 
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described it as "a angry, aggressive manner." (R. 113/27). When asked what he 
meant by that, he stated "The eye contact for one, the constant, staring eye contact as 
he was walking in a deliberate manner approaching my vehicle." (R. 113/28.) 
The second factor Valentine testified about was that there was an object in the 
Defendant's hand that he couldn't see. "I'm looking straight out window [sic] and I 
see one of his hands go in one of his front pockets, . . . and he comes out with 
something that was being palmed in the palm of his hands. He was hiding it from 
me." (R. 115/13). This changed a little bit at the trial. The prosecutor asked 
Valentine if he could tell whether or not the Defendant had something for sure in his 
hands. (R. 113/29). Officer Valentine answered, "I couldn't. It was turned away 
from me. I couldn't see if he had withdrawn anything from the pocket or not." 
Third, Valentine testified that the Defendant was yelling at him. "He was 
yelling at me and I really couldn't understand exactly what he was yelling at me at 
that point." (R. 115/14). 
The fourth factor was that Defendant wouldn't show him his hands. (R. 115/15, 
R. 113/29-30). The fifth factor was that Defendant continued walking towards the 
officer. "He continued on around and rounded the driver's side of my vehicle and 
continued on toward me. (R. 113/32). At this point Officer Valentine drew his 
weapon. Id. When Defendant saw the weapon he stopped and began tossing items. 
(R. 113/33). The Defendant "tossed the item that was in his hand." Id. He then began 
emptying his pockets and throwing the items from his pockets onto the ground. (R. 
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113/34). At this point Valentine hadn't given Defendant any instructions other than to 
stop and show him his hands. Id. While the Defendant was emptying his pockets he 
was yelling "Do you want to see what's in my pockets? I'll show you what I've got, 
this is what I've got." (R. 113/35). 
As Defendant was emptying his pockets Valentine ordered him to his knees. 
(R. 113/36). When Defendant finished emptying his pockets he went to his knees. Id. 
Valentine ordered him to place his hands out in front of him and lay down on the 
sidewalk, to which he complied. Id. While the Defendant was laying in the street 
Valentine placed him in handcuffs and helped him to his feet. (R. 113/37). Valentine 
then began frisking the Defendant. Id. 
On cross examination at the preliminary hearing, Defendant's attorney asked 
Valentine why he decided to frisk the Defendant. Valentine answered, "I don't know 
what's in his possession, I need to look out for myself - -" (R. 115/33). Valentine 
admitted that he didn't see any bulges in Defendant's pockets. (R. 115/33-34). 
Valentine had watched Defendant empty his pockets including the metallic bar he's 
seen in his back pocket. (R. 115/34). After Valentine acknowledged that he had seen 
Defendant empty his pockets, Defendant's attorney asked him a second time why he 
decided to conduct a frisk. Valentine's response was "It's procedure. That's 
something I do when I'm going to handcuff somebody. That's what I'm taught." Id. 
When asked why he was handcuffing Defendant, Valentine answered, "For our safety; 
my safety and his safety." Id. 
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Valentine then acknowledged that his only information was that Defendant was 
looking in windows and that that act wasn't illegal. Id. Valentine also acknowledged 
that he didn't have reason to believe that Defendant had done anything illegal. (R. 
115/34-35.) Valentine was asked why he handcuffed Defendant and he answered, 
"His aggressive nature and behavior. I didn't know what his intentions - -" (R. 
115/35). 
Although the officer characterized the Defendant's behavior as "aggressive," 
when pressed as to what was aggressive, he could only point to an angry stare. (R. 
113/28). Valentine also pointed to the Defendant yelling at him. The only specific 
statements that he heard the Defendant yell was, "Do you want to see what's in my 
pockets? I'll show you what I've got, this is what I've got." (R. 113/35). 
These factors didn't give Officer Valentine reasonable suspicion to conduct a 
Terry frisk. Especially when Defendant had already thrown the object Valentine was 
concerned with and had also emptied his pockets. In State v. White, 856 P.2d 656 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993), this Court held that "prior to instituting a frisk, a police officer 
must reasonably conclude in light of his experience that the unusual conduct he 
observes might suggest criminal activity and danger." Id. at 660. Officer Valentine 
acknowledge that he didn't have reason to believe that Defendant had done anything 
illegal. (R. 115/34-35). The Defendant's response to Officer valentine was more 
consistent with someone being upset about being stopped and harassed by a police 
officer then it was indicative of criminal activity or danger. For these reasons, the 
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evidence that was found during the alleged "frisk" should have been suppressed by 
the trial court. 
C. The search of the Defendant's pant leg exceeded the scope of a Terry 
frisk. 
Even if this Court finds that Officer Valentine had reasonable suspicion that 
justified stopping the Defendant, and reasonable suspicion that justified a Terry frisk, 
this Court should find that the officer exceeded the scope of a Teny frisk. A Terry 
frisk is "a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt 
to discover weapons . . ." Terry v. Ohio, at 30 (emphasis added). 
A Terry frisk is less intrusive then a search and requires reasonable suspicion 
versus probable cause. See, Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 698 (1981). It is 
also limited to the outer clothing. In the case at bar, Officer Valentine exceeded the 
scope of a proper frisk when he lifted the Defendant's pant leg. When Valentine 
pulled up the Defendant's pant leg the bindle of heroin fell out. (R. 115/37). 
Valentine was asked by Defendant's attorney why he pulled the pant leg up instead of 
patting it. (R. 115/38). His answer was "I'm a rather large officer with a big belly 
and I'm still trying to control his hands with one hand and yet still safely reach down 
to his ankle and I couldn't feel his ankle - -" (R. 115/38-39). Valentine later 
acknowledged that he chose to lift the pant leg up instead of patting it. (R. 115/39). 
During the trial, Valentine testified that "I couldn't reach the ankle area in his pant 
leg. I've got the vest on and the belt and my big belly so I was having a hard time 
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controlling his hands. He still wanted to get the hands around to the side area, so I 
had to control the hands and I couldn't safely reach down and grab his ankle and feel, 
so I lifted up the pant leg to visually inspect the sock area." (R. 113/40). It was when 
Valentine did this that the heroin fell out. "When I lifted the pant leg up that's when 
the bindle fell to the ground." Id. 
When Valentine lifted the pant leg he was no longer conducting a frisk of the 
outer clothing. This was a search that requires probable cause. There is no big belly 
or fat officer exception to the Terry doctrine. A Terry frisk is a narrow and limited 
search of a suspect's outer clothing. The trial court erred when it found that this more 
intrusive search "was in conformance with the idea that backs up Terry" (R. 112/26). 
Officer Valentine had called for back-up and another officer arrived shortly after he 
searched the Defendant's pant leg. (R. 115/22). If Valentine's big belly prevented 
him from conducting a proper Terry frisk he simply could have waited for the back-up 
officer to arrive and had him perform the frisk. 
In State v. Lafond, 68 P.3d 1043 (Utah Ct. App. 2003), this Court noted that 
"there is ample authority to support the proposition that requiring a suspect to disclose 
the contents of his or her pockets constitutes a search requiring probable cause." Id. at 
fn. 12. In the same vein, just as an officer reaching a hand into a pocket requires 
probable cause, so should pulling up a pant leg to inspect a sock. Since the officer 
exceeded the scope of a limited Terry frisk, this Court should reverse the Defendant's 
conviction in this matter. 
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CONCLUSION 
Officer Valentine violated the Defendant's Fourth Amendment right throughout 
this encounter. The stopped and detained Defendant without sufficient reasonable 
suspicion that he was engaged in illegal activity. He then proceeded to conduct a 
Terry frisk without reasonable suspicion that Defendant was armed or dangerous. 
Finally, he exceeded the scope of that frisk by lifting the Defendant's pant leg. For 
these reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests this Court to reverse Defendant's 
conviction. 
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just this case but the law, too, so it's more difficult than 
it probably would be to somebody who's experienced, but here 
is what I'm going to rule: I'm going to deny the motion to 
suppress, and I'm going to do so for these reasons -- here's 
what I find to be the most important facts to me in making 
this decision: 
First of all, we've got a known informant who 
contacted — who is a criminal justice professor who contacts 
dispatch, describes a suspicious person looking in vehicles 
and gives a description of some clothing apparently. Then 
the dispatch relays that information on to the officer. The 
officer at the campus then as he's walking to his car, as I 
recall it, he sees a person who matches the description that 
he's been given from the dispatch. He gets into his police 
car, a marked car, pulls up behind the defendant who's riding 
his bike at that point. 
He does do this — what I think is really agreed upon --
Level I stop at a point by either honking his air or car 
horn, stops the defendant who briefly says something to the 
effect of I'm going over there and points and then gets back 
on his bike and pedals away. He does pedal away in the 
opposing lane of traffic which would be a bit unusual. And 
the officer also notices a black object extending -- a 
metallic object extending from the back pocket of 
Mr. Naranjo. 
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At that point -- it seems to me it!s undisputed at that 
point those facts. Both sides seem to agree that those are 
the fact at that point. Then the officer turns on his 
lights. It's unclear at that point if he knew more than what 
I!ve just recited or not, but to me that alone is 
sufficient -- reasonable suspicion could be based on those 
articulable facts alone in my mind. 
At that point, when he turns on the light, his overhead 
lights, it does seem to me thatfs a Level II stop at that 
point by turning those lights on. He does — and it!s 
unclear whether he sees the bicycle down in the travel lane 
on Dixon Drive whether that enters into his decision or not 
in turning on the lights, that was unclear to me at least 
from the transcript. 
But it's clear at around that same point in time when 
he's turned on the lights that the defendant is approaching 
the officer, the officer describes it as aggressive, that he 
has an angry stare with him, he's yelling. He goes to the 
passenger side of the car, he sees Mr. Naranjo put his hand 
in his front pocket and comes out with something and he's 
concealing what that is from the officer's sight. 
And then when the officer gets out and he's talking to 
Mr. Naranjo, Mr. Naranjo is described as yelling at that 
point. He's asked to step around in front of the vehicle and 
keep his hands in sight. Mr. Naranjo disobeys that order 
